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Recategorization of Prepositions as Complementizers: The Case of Temporal
Prepositions in English
Stanley Dubinsky, Kemp Williams
In this article we consider the syntax of temporal prepositions (e.g., after, before, while)
and propose that they differ from nontemporals (e.g., without, despite, about) in that
they occupy a C0 position whenever they occur before a clausal complement. Diachronic
and dialectal evidence suggests that this distinction is attributable to a category change
that the temporals underwent sometime before the 17th century. This analysis at once
begs for an explanation of the difference between these temporals and the preposition
for, which also fills C? but exhibits quite different behavior. We first examine the dialectal
and diachronic evidence for positing a category distinction between the two classes and
then reexamine an account of prepositions and gerundive complements proposed by
Johnson (1988). The proposal made here bears on attempts by Emonds (1985) and Grimshaw (1991) to collapse the distinction between C and P. It provides additional evidence
for the relatedness of these two syntactic categories, but also highlights potential problems with entirely eliminating the distinction between them (a direct comparison of our
analysis and Emonds's is given in footnote 5).
1 Evidence for Recategorization
One of the obvious differences between temporal and nontemporal prepositions in modern standard English is that only the former can have a tensed clausal complement (la-b).
At the same time, neither class can appear with an overt complementizer (lc-d).
We wish to acknowledgefour anonymousLI reviewersfor theirhelpfulcommentsand criticism,Michael
Montgomeryfor his generous help with Southeasterndialects, WilliamDavies and Kyle Johnson for their
advice and encouragement,the audienceat the FLSM 4 meetingin Iowa City, and the followingindividuals:
EdwinBattistella,ChrisCuly, DorothyDisterheft,WilliamLadusaw,John Moore, LuigiRizzi, BeatriceSantorini, and Daniel Seely.
Linguistic Inquiry, Volume 26, Number 1, Winter 1995
125-137
C) 1995 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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(1) a.
b.
c.
d.

AND REPLIES

John left after I told him to.
*Johnleft without I told him to.
*Johnleft after that I told him to.
*Johnleft without that I told him to.

Given the facts in (la) and (lb), it is likely that the ungrammaticalityof (1c) and the
ungrammaticalityof (Id) are unrelated.If temporal "prepositions"actually occupy Co,
then they would not be expected to cooccur with an overt that complementizer,as in
(lc). If nontemporalsare in fact prepositions,then the ungrammaticalityof both (lb) and
(Id) could be attributedto a general constraint against prepositions selecting tensed
complements.Attributingthe ungrammaticalityof (lc) and (Id) to distinctfactors admits
the possibility that the two structuresneed not be uniformlyruled out in all varieties of
English. Indeed, evidence showing that the grammaticalityof these structuresvaried (or
varies) independentlywould supportthis proposal. As it happens, diachronicevidence
and dialectal data both suggest that the ungrammaticalityof (1c) and (Id) is the result
of events separatedby at least two centuries.
In certainSoutheasterndialects of AmericanEnglish, nontemporalprepositionscan
be followed by a tensed CP complement, as in (2a)/(3a). Moreover, for speakers who
allow (2a)/(3a),the complementizercan optionally be overt. Alongside (2a)/(3a), many
of these speakers permit (2b)/(3b),with the overt complementizerthat.
(2) a. %Theynever came to church without they broughttheir Bibles.
b. %Theynever came to church without that they broughttheir Bibles.
(3) a. %Geneleft despite John said he wouldn't.
b. %Geneleft despite that John said he wouldn't.
However, despite accepting(2b)/(3b),which containa prepositionfollowed by a CP with
an overt complementizer,these speakers do not accept temporalelements such as after
and since with an overt complementizer,as shown in (4).
(4) a. They came to church after (*that)they read their Bibles.
b. Jane has been lonely since (*that) her husbanddied.
If after in (4a) were followed by a CP complement,as withoutis in (2), then there would
be no plausibleexplanationfor these speakers' rejectingthat following after. If, on the
other hand, after is a complementizer,then the differencebetween the standardand the
regionaldialects is explained by proposingthat speakers of standardEnglish uniformly
disallowtensed CP complementsof prepositions,whereasspeakersof the regionaldialect
allow them. The temporalelement after in (4a) is not a preposition,but a complementizer,
and CPs cannot have multipleheads in any dialect.
Additionalevidence comes from the distinct historicalevolution of these elements.
Althoughafter and before continue to be acceptablewith a tensed IP complement,their
occurrencewith an overt complementizer(i.e., with a CP complement),as illustratedin
(5) and (6), is attested only throughthe 17thcentury (see Poutsma 1928and Allen 1980).
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Still, the existence of this usage up to that point indicates that after and before regularly
selected tensed CP complementsat and prior to that time.
(5) It is solde rythe well aftyr that the wole was. (1464; OED 1:168)
(6) Before that Philip called thee . . . I saw thee. (1611; OED 1:764)

In contrast, withoutand besides followed by a tensed CP complement(i.e., that + IP)
are found well into the 19thcentury (and dialectally into the 20th).
(7) ... it was next to impossible that a casket could be thrown into her garden
... withoutthat she ... shouldhave caughtintimationof thingsextraordinary
transpiringon her premises. (1853; C. Bronte, Villette, ch. xii; OED XII:226)
(8) The representatives of the majority, besides that they would themselves be
improved in quality ... would no longer have the whole field to themselves. (1860; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government; OED

1:819)
There thus seems to be a 200-yearinterval between the last attested use of temporals
with overt complementizersand the last attested use of nontemporalprepositions(such
as withoutand besides) followed by a tensed clause. This supportsthe hypothesis that
the modernungrammaticalityof after that and before that in the standarddialect is due
to a categorialshift on the part of temporalprepositions sometime in the 16th century,
and that the ungrammaticalityof without that is due to a more recent innovation that
bans all prepositionsfrom takingtensed finite complements. Speculationthat the disappearance of after that might be the result of some superficialconstraint, and possibly
relatedto the loss of wh-that, is without basis. Allen (1980)notes that wh-thatconstructions die out by the end of the 15th century, whereas after that (etc.) is attested until
the late 17th century. Under the proposal made here, the ungrammaticalityof wh-that
in the standarddialect has to do with the presence of phonologicallyovert elements in
both Spec CP and Co, whereas the ungrammaticalityof after that is the result (beginning
in the 17thcentury) of two elements occupying the same node. Notice that the former
constraintstill admits dialectal exceptions (Haden 1993),but the latter does not.
(9) a. %I didn't get why that she was supposed to wait for them.
b. *They came to church after that they read their Bibles.
Seeing that this change affected a single semanticallycoherent set of lexical entries,
one mightask how critical the role of purely syntactic recategorizationis in accounting
for this change, and whetherthe category shift mightbe an epiphenomenonaccompanying some "real" semantic shift. The answer can be found in comparingthe evolution of
these elements with the evolution of anotherprepositionthat has come to function as a
complementizer,namely, for. For is quite distinct from the temporals, as shown by
the fact that it selects as complementsonly untensed, irrealisclauses (i.e., infinitivals).
Compare(10) and (11).
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(10) a. John danced after she finished singing.
b. *Johndanced after her to sing.
(11) a. *For she would leave early would be a shame.
b. For her to leave early would be a shame.
There is thus, a priori,no reason to suppose that the evolution offor should parallelthat
of after and before. The first attestationsoffor precedingthe subjectof an infinitivedate
from late 14th-centurytexts.'
(12) It is better for a synner to suffre trybulacyon .

.

. in his life .

.

. than to be

eternallytourmentedin hell. (1508; OED IV:411)
Following suggestions by Stockwell (1976), the earliest instances of constructionslike
(12) had a structuresuch as that given in (13), where a synner is the NP object of the
prepositionfor and controls a null PRO infinitivalsubject.
(13) It is better [pp for a synneri] [cp PROi to suffre trybulacyon] .

..

Stockwell suggests that for was reanalyzed as a complementizerand that by the 16th
century (12) mighthave actually been analyzed as in (14).
(14) It is better [cp for [IP a synner to suffre trybulacyon]]. ..
This view garnerssupportfrom the fact that constructionsthat requirean analysis such
as (14) do not generallyoccur until later-that is, until well into the 16thcentury, based
on Lightfoot's (1979)citations.2

1
The use of for plus a bareinfinitival,meaning'in order(to)', is foundmuchearlierand seems unrelated
to the use of for before the subjectof an infinitival.This usage is attestedas early as the beginningof the 12th
century,andfor is certainlya prepositionin these cases. Sentence (i) providesa 13th-centuryexampleof the
usage.
(i) He bi gan to schake ys axe, for to smyte anon. (1297;OED IV:410)
Thefor-to clause in (i) mighthave either of the following structures:
(ii) [pp for [cp[Ip PRO to smyte anon]]]
(iii) [ppfor [NP to smyte anon]] (adaptingfrom Lightfoot 1979)
In other cases, wherefor to VP does not have a purposivemeaning,it appearsto be "part of the infinitival
morphology"(Lightfoot1979:187-188).This is evident from the fact that a subject, when it does appear,has
nominativeCase and precedesfor. Accordingly,(iv) alternateswith (v) in the 14thcentury, and (vi) does not
appearuntil 200 years later (see Lightfoot 1979:186-195).
(iv) [for to go] is necessary (from 1205)
(v) [I for to go] is necessary (from 14thc.)
(vi) [for me to go] is necessary (from 1567)
2
Lightfoot(1979)rejectsthe reanalysisoffor froma prepositionto a complementizerin favorof a different
approach.However, the approachthat he adopts (based on Chomsky 1973)is not tenablewithin the current
syntacticmodel. Lightfootsuggests(pp. 196-197)that in the constructionforJohn to leave Comp(S')expands
to PP, that this PP is headedby for, and thatJohn moves from subjectof S to the complementpositionunder

PP.
(i)

[S[Comp[PP

for

[NP

JohnIl]]] [s t1 to leave]]
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(15) a. for us to go is necessary (1567)
b. what would be better than for you to go (1534)
In (15a),for example, the stringfor us to go occupies subjectposition and cannot consist
of autonomousPP and CP constituents.It would appear,then, that the reanalysisoffor in
preclausalposition,fromprepositionto complementizer,opened the way for the temporal
prepositionsto follow. The recategorizationof prepositionsinto complementizersis thus
seen to be a development in the English languagein which semantic factors may have
played a secondary role, but in which syntactic parameterswere preeminent.
2 Prepositionsand Gerunds
In this section we will examineJohnson's (1988)account of the subcategorizationalproperties of temporaland nontemporalprepositionsbased on their interactionwith clausal
gerunds.Johnson's proposed distinctionbetween temporalsand nontemporalswill turn
out to make the correct predictionsregardingthe latter, but not the former.
Johnson (1988) observes that gerundivecomplementsof nontemporalprepositions
can have null, genitive, or accusative subjects. The gerundivecomplementsof temporal
prepositions, on the other hand, cannot support accusatively marked subjects. These
facts are shown in (16).
(16) a. John left without me telling him to. (cf....
b. Johnileft without ei being told to.
c. *John left after me telling him to. (cf ....

without my telling him to)
after my telling him to)

d. Johnileft after ei being told to.
UnderJohnson'saccount, the nontemporalprepositionsare (optional)exceptionalCasemarking(ECM)prepositions.Accordingly,in (16b) and (16d)both after and withoutare
claimed to have a CP complement containing an (appropriately)ungoverned PRO. In
(16a) withoutis said to select a bare IP complementand to assign accusative Case to its
subject, me. The ungrammaticalityof (16c) is attributedto a violationof the Case Filter,
which follows from the inability of temporal prepositions to select a bare IP clausal
complement.Johnson's representationsare given in (17).
(17) a.

John left without [Ip me telling him to].

b. Johni left without [cP[IP PROi being told to]].
c. *John left after [cP[IP me telling him to]].
d. Johni left after [cp[lIp PRO1being told to]].
3 Note that POSS-ingclauses can appearfollowingtemporalprepositions,which is expected if they are
NPs.
(i) a. John left [aftermy tellingthe story].
b. *Johnleft [afterme tellingthe story].
We follow Reuland(1983)in acceptingevidence presentedby Horn (1975)and Williams(1975)that POSS-ing
clauses are NPs.
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Johnson derives the requirementthat after take a CP complement in (17c) from
Larson's (1988) analysis of the scopal ambiguitypresent in (18) (originallypointed out
in Geis 1970).
(18) John left after Sheila said he should leave.
(18) can be interpretedas meaningeither 'John left after the time of Sheila's saying that
he shouldleave' or 'Johnleft afterthe time which Sheila said he shouldleave at'. Larson
accounts for this by proposingthat a temporaloperatormay be moved either out of the
clause containingthe verb said (resultingin the formerinterpretation)or out of the more
deeply embeddedclause containingthe verb leave (resultingin the latter interpretation).
The two representations,under Larson's account, are given in (19).
(19) a. John left [ppafter [cp Opi [IP Sheila said [cP he should leave] till].
b. John left [ppafter [cp Opi [lP Sheila said [cp he should leave till]].
On the basis of these and other facts, Larson demonstratesthat a finite clause following
a temporalprepositionmust contain a null temporaloperatorthat moves to Spec CP.'
Although providinga very plausible account for the Case markingof subjects of
gerundiveclauses, Johnson's and Larson's accounts of prepositionalcomplementation
raise at least two objections: (i) If temporals are prepositions that always select a CP
complement,why can the head of this CP never be overt?
(20) *Johnleft [after [that [I told him to]]].
(ii) If the CP selected by a temporalprepositionalways contains a temporaloperator,
why can the operatornever be overt?
(21) *Johnleft [after [when [I told him to]]].
As Johnsonacknowledges, his account does not explain the ill-formednessof either the
overt that-complementizerin (20) or the overt temporaloperatorwhen in (21).
Accepting Johnson's analysis of (16a) and (16b), let us assume that nontemporal
prepositions,such as without, select either NP or clausal complementsand are optional
ECM heads in the latter instance (i.e., they can select either CP or IP clausal complements). Suppose now (on the basis of the evidence presented in section 1) that temporal
elements such as after are bicategorial:they can occupy either P0 or CO.When after is
a preposition,it subcategorizesonly for an NP complement.These differencesbetween
after and withoutare illustratedin (22).5
4 Larson bases these conclusions on across-the-boardextractionfacts, as well as on the restrictionof
interpretationsby the Wh-IslandConstraint,the ComplexNoun PhraseConstraint,andthe AdjunctCondition.
s If one were to adopt Emonds's (1985)programof entirelycollapsingthe distinctionbetween P and C
(claimingthatall complementizersbelongto the categoryP), thenthe distinctionbetweentemporalandnontemporalprepositionsgiven in (22) would necessarilybe stated in terms of subcategorization.For Emonds, subjectless gerundivesare bareVPs, gerundiveswith possessive subjectsare NPs with a phonologicallynullhead,
and gerundiveswith accusative subjectsare presumedto be NPs followed by bare VPs in which the subject
NP is Case-markedby the preposition(Emondsdoes not treatACC-ingclauses explicitly).In orderfor Emonds
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NP]j
{CP/IP}]J

NP]}

The two possible configurationsfor after are illustratedin (23), with the moved temporal
operatorshowing up in (23b).
(23) a. We threw a party [pp after [NP John's departure]].
b. We threw a party [cp Opi [c' after [lp John departedtill].
In (23a) after is a P and assigns Case to its NP complement,John's departure.In (23b)
it is a C.'
The analysis adopted here presents immediatesolutions to the two problemscited
above. First, if after is requiredto have a CP complement, as Johnson (1988) suggests,
then (20) should be grammatical.If, on the other hand, after is a complementizer,then
(20) is an instance of a clause containingtwo overt complementizersand as such is ill
formed. (20) is repeated here, with the appropriatestructure.7
to account for these two prepositionalclasses in modern standardEnglish, the following lexical statement
would suffice:
NP/VP/NPVP]
(i) a. without: P, [
NP/VP/IP]
b. after:
P, [
As (i) illustrates,withouttakes all three types of gerunds(NP, VP, and NP-VP),whereasafter takes possessor
subjectand null-subjectgerunds(NP and VP) as well as tensed IPs. Althoughthis lexical statementaccounts
for the distributionof gerundivecomplementsand of tensed clausal complementsof prepositions,it leaves
severalquestionsunanswered.As notedin the text, withouttakes an IP complementin some dialectsof English
and could also do so in standardvarietiesof Englishthroughthe 19thcentury. In these varieties of English,
it can also take a clause introducedby an overt complementizer.On the other hand, after could take a clause
introducedby an overt complementizeronly untilthe startof the 17thcentury. In Emonds's system (wherein
all complementizersare Ps), this would mean that both temporaland nontemporalprepositionscould, until
the 17thcentury,take PP complements,which themselvesexpandedto RIP. Temporalprepositionslost their
ability to take these PP complementsearly in the 17th century, and nontemporalprepositionslost both the
PP andthe IP subcategorizationssimultaneouslyin the 19thcentury.Whatis lackingin this alternativeaccount
is an explanationfor why the loss of PP andIP subcategorizationwas simultaneousin the case of nontemporals,
and a motivationfor the loss of PP subcategorizationin the case of temporals. In Emonds's system, toinfinitivalsarea species of IP andfor-toinfinitivalsinvolve a P witha nontensedIP complement.Consequently,
this alternativeanalysis would be hardput to draw a direct connection(as has been done here) between the
contemporaneousacquisitionof IP subcategorizationby the prepositionfor and loss of PP subcategorization
by the prepositionafter. Finally, there is no apparentprincipledexplanationin Emonds's system for why
nontemporalprepositionsas a class have NPVP (ACC-ing)subcategorizationand temporalprepositionsdo
not.
6 It is first proposedin Huang 1982that preposition-likeelements introducingadjunctclauses mightbe
complementizers.
7 Lasnikand Saito (1992)also observe that this structurecorrectlyrules out sentences such as (20). They
furtherillustratethat the structureaccounts for subject-objectasymmetriesin the extractionof wh-elements
from adverbialclauses. They do not suggest that temporalsmight form a special class with regardto their
abilityto occupy Co, nor do they make any proposalregardingthe differencebetween after andfor.
This explanationassumes that the CP complementof after cannot iterate. Otherwise,we mightpredicta
structuresuch as (i).
(i) John left [cp after [cp that [lp I told him to]]].
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I told him to]].

The second questionconcernedthe impossibilityof an overt temporaloperatorin constituents headedby after. In Larson's and Johnson's accounts, a tensed complementclause
following after contains a temporaloperator, and this operatormoves to Spec CP. The
ungrammaticalityof (21) is anomalous and must be ruled out in an ad hoc manner, if
after is a prepositiontakinga CP complement. This is especially so, in view of the fact
that many prepositionscan take [ + wh] CP complements.
(24) a. They talked for hours [about [whetherFrank ought to leave]].
b. I won't bore you [with [why everythingis such a mess]].
c. I'll have everythingready [by [when they get in]].
Under the present account, (21) is ill formed because after is a complementizer.The
structureof (21) is analogous to that of (25).8
(25) *John left [cp after

[Ip

wheni [lP Frank heard the story ti]]].

(25) is ungrammaticalbecause the wh-element when has adjoined to IP. In Chomsky
1986:92it is assumed (on the basis of data broughtout by Lasnik) that wh-elementsmay
not adjointo IP. Lasnik's data are given in (26).
(26) a. Bill thinks [cp that [IP Johni LIPI like ti]]].
b. *Who thinks [cp that [lp whoi [lP I like ti]]]?

(26b) is ill formed because a wh-elementwho has adjoinedto the lower IP, and (25) is
impossiblefor the same reason. Even if the overt operatorwhen did occupy the specifier
position of the CP projected by after, the sentence would still be ungrammatical.That
is, the temporal operator must be null, as (27) shows ((27b-c) are cited from Haden
1993).
(27) a.
b.

John left [cp Opi/*wheni[c after [1P Frankheard the story ti]]].
[cp Wheni [c that

[Ip

I was and a little tiny boy ti]]] .

.

. A foolish thing

was but a toy. (Shakespeare's TwelfthNight)
c. %I'llhave to talk to the investigatorto find out [cp whati[c that [Ip ti started
it]]]. (OzarkEnglish)
In (27a) a null temporaloperatorcan occupy Spec CP, but the overt wh-elementwhen
As pointed out by a reviewer, CP recursionis limited in its distributionand appears to arise only in the
complementsof certainproposition-selectingverbs, such as say and think.This is illustratedin (ii).
(ii) John said [cp that [cp Bill [P he could never trust]]].
Notice thatthe CP recursionin (ii) is lexically licensed by the V that selects the highestCP as its complement.
In (i) the CP is an adjunct;and if CP recursionis restrictedto arguments,then we should not expect to find
it in temporaladjunctsof the sort being discussed here.
8 It is assumedthat (i) involves a free relative NP complementof the preposition(not complementizer)
after.

(i) After what Franksaid to him, Bill ought to sue for slander.
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cannot do so. This is predictedby the Doubly Filled Comp Filter (Chomskyand Lasnik
1977)and by Rizzi's (1991) Wh-Criterion(developed from May 1985), which also rule
out (27b) and (27c) in standardEnglish. However, (27a) with when is worse than (27b)
and (27c), which are attested in English texts prior to the 16th century and in modern
Americandialectal speech. We would suggest that an additionalfactor analogousto the
Wh-Criterionserves to rule out (27a).
Rizzi (1991)formulatesthe Wh-Criterionas follows:
(28) The Wh-Criterion

a.
b.

A wh-operatormust be in a spec-head configurationwith a [ + wh] XO.
A [ + wh] XI must be in a spec-head configurationwith a wh-operator.

Later in his paper, Rizzi suggests that other features such as [ + neg] mightalso require
agreementin a spec-head configuration.Now consider the difference between adjunct
clauses introducedby when and adjunctclauses introducedby after.
(29) a. When Harryfinished speaking, John left.
b. After Harryfinished speaking, John left.
c. *Whenafter Harryfinished speaking, John left.
d. %When that I was and a little tiny boy, . . .

In (29a) the clause introducedby when refers to a particular(singular)instant, whereas
in (29b) the clause introduced by after refers to a potentially infinite set of instants
(delimitedonly by pragmaticconsiderations).In view of this, suppose that when carries
the feature [ + sing] and after, the feature [ - sing]. If this feature is also checked in the
spec-headconfiguration,then the ungrammaticalityof (29c) follows from an agreement
clash between the [ + sing] specifier when and the [ - sing] head after. Since the complementizerthat is presumablyneutralin this regard,we would expect that (29d)would be
permissiblein dialects where that is also neutralwith regardto the feature [wh].
Returningto the problemthat initiated this discussion, we find that we do not yet
have a solutionfor the inabilityof temporalprepositionsto take ACC-ingcomplements.
AssumingJohnson's proposals concerningECM prepositions (e.g., without), Larson's
proposals concerning operators in the complements of temporalprepositions, and the
proposalmade here concerningthe categorialstatus of after, the sentences in (16) should
have the structuresshown in (30).
(30) a. John left [pp without [lP me telling him to]].
b. Johnileft [ppwithout [cP[lP PROibeing told to]]].
c. *Johnleft [cp Opi after [Ip me telling him to tj]].
d.

Johni left [cp Opj after

[Ip

PROi being told to tj]].

Althoughit is clear from the facts presented above that after does occupy CO,it is not
immediatelyobvious why after cannot Case-markthe subject of its IP complementin
(30c), consideringthat withoutcan do so in (30a). In fact, if one comparesafter with the
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prepositionalcomplementizerfor, one might expect the grammaticalityjudgments for
(30c) and (30d) to be the reverse of what they are. Considerthe facts in (31).
(31) a.

It is impossible [cp for [lp me to leave]].

b. *It is impossible [cp for

[Ip

PRO to leave]].

Under the standardtreatment,for assigns Case to me in (31a) and to PRO in (31b),
renderingthe first grammaticaland the second ungrammatical.Why is this not the case
in (30)?
The answer involves Larson's requirementthat temporalprepositions obligatorily
select clauses containingtemporaloperators. Assuming that somethingakin to Rizzi's
(1991)Wh-Criterionis at work here, let us state the followingrequirement(adaptingfrom
Rizzi):
(32) Temporal Operator Criterion

a.
b.

A temporal operator must be in a spec-head configuration with a
[+ temporal]XO.
A L+ temporal]XOmust be in a spec-head configurationwith a temporal
operator.

Accordingto (32), the relationbetween the operatorin (30) and after is analogousto the
relation between a [+ wh] Co and a wh-operator.In this fashion, a temporal complementizersuch as after is requiredto stand in a spec-head configurationwith a temporal
operator.
Suppose now that we distinguishpurely structuralrelationsholdingbetween heads
and phrases, such as Case assignmentand agreement,from the lexically projectedrelation of 0-assignment,in a mannersimilarto that proposedby Manzini(1992).Expanding
the scope of relations covered in Manzini's K(Case)-governmentto include agreement,
let us define u(structural)-government
as follows:
(33) u(structural)-government
a u-governs 13iff at"structurallyaddresses" ,B,a a lexical head, and f3phrasal.

Here, following Manzini, the term structurallyaddresses is taken to mean 'assigns an
index of position'. It is assumed that cr-governmentmay be spelled out by agreement
morphologyon the head, Case morphologyon the phrase, or a combinationof the two.
We also adopt a principleof unipolarity,such that
(34) Unipolarity

If axX-governs (X = 0 or a) 1, then 13is to the right/leftof at.
This principlerequiresthat a given head in a given projectiongovern (in a given manner)
in only one direction.Accordingly,where the specifieris on one side of axandthe complement is on the other, a cannot X-governboth. A given head may 0-governand ur-govern
in the same direction-for example, in the case of a V, which both 0-governs and ugoverns (assigns structuralCase to) its object NP. A head can also 0-govern in one
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directionand a-govern in another-for example, in the case of I0, which 0-governs VP
and u-governs (agrees with) the subject NP. What a head cannot do is X-govern (where
X = u or 0) simultaneouslyin two directions.9
The UnipolarityPrinciple(34) can readily explain the divergent behavior of after
andfor. Since after necessarily u-governs (i.e., agrees with) its specifier, in accordance
with the requirementslaid out in (32), it cannot cr-govern(i.e., Case-mark)the specifier
of its complement. Since Spec IP in (30c-d) is neither 0-governednor u-governed, it is
available for PRO. The complementizerfor, on the other hand, does not select any
operator-likeelement and thus does not u-govern the specifier of its own projection. It
thereforecan and does (r-governto its right, and Case-marksthe specifierof its complement IP, licensing the overt NP in (31a).
The specific requirementin (32) that the temporaloperatorand the temporalhead
be in "a spec-headconfiguration"becomes problematicwhen the temporalhead selects
an NP complement,and we will show that a simplificationof (32), in terms of u-government, is warranted.As pointed out by a reviewer, when a [ +temporal] X? heads a PP
and takes an NP complement, the NP must denote 'times'. Thus, after the news must
mean somethinglike 'after the time of the broadcastof the news' or 'after the time of
the receipt of the news'. Now, according to (32), this PP should have the following
derivation,whereinone type of cr-government(Case marking)is to the right,and another
type of u-government(temporaloperatorspec-head agreement)is to the left.
(35)

[PP[NP

the news]i [p after till

Although(35) satisfies (32), it violates (34). Suppose, however, that we change (32) to
take advantageof the fact that cr-governmentcan work in either direction.
(36) Temporal Government Criterion

a. A [ + temporal]X? must u-govern a temporalXP.
b. A temporalXP must be u-governed by a [+ temporal]XO.
Accordingto (36), since the complement of after in after the news is itself a temporal
XP, it can satisfy the TemporalGovernmentCriterionwithout moving from its Casemarkedposition. In (37), then, all u-government(Case assignmentand temporalgovernment) is to the right.
(37) [pp[p' after

[NP

the news]]]

(36)will only force a-governmentto be leftwardwhen the complementof the [ + temporal]
9 Under(34), a verbmust 0-governin one direction.Underthe VP-internalsubjecthypothesis,this would
requirethat all argumentsof the verb be base-generatedon the same side. This positionis consistentwith VPinternalsubject proposals, such as that of Diesing (1992:23-29), wherein this position is assumed to be 0governedby the verb. Since the positionis always empty at S-Structurein English(underDiesing's account),
it is plausiblethat the EnglishVP has the followingstructure,with rightward0-government:[vp[v V NPOBJ]
NPSUBJ].Accordingto Diesing, if PROis requiredto be ungovernedand is generatedin VP-internalposition,
then it must move into some higherfunctionalprojection.German(which has both IP and VP subjectsat SStructure)is unproblematic,since the VP is head-final.
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head is not the temporalXP with which the head must agree. This naturallyhappens
whenever the complementis an IP containinga temporaloperator.
Under this analysis, then, after andfor can both take either NP or IP complements.
They differ in that, when after occupies a C?, a temporaloperatormoves out of its IP
complementinto Spec CP, and the constraintstated in (36)forces it to u-governleftward.
This then precludesit from Case-markingthe specifierof its complementIP. Whenafter
selects an NP complement,which must be [ + temporal],it a-governs this complement,
allowing it to both Case-markthe complement and satisfy the TemporalGovernment
Criterion.Since no temporalXP is ever involved with the prepositionfor, and it is never
requiredto u-govern leftward, it is presumed to Case-markits complement NP or the
NP specifier of its complementIP in every instance. The italicized constituents in (38)
are those that are a-governed by the head of the phrase.
(38) a.

[cp XPi [after [Ip

b.

[pp after NP]
[cp for [lP NP . ..
[pp for NP]

C.

d.

.. . ti ...

I]]
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On Verbs That Fail to UndergoV-Second
Hilda Koopman

In this article I develop an analysis for the syntactic distributionin Dutch of particle
verbs, verbs with an inseparableprepositionalprefix, verbs with the preflx her- 'again',
and particle verbs prefixed with her-. Empiricalevidence based on the distributionof
particle verbs and the prefix her- will establish that the finite verb in nonroot environments in Dutch is in situ (or more correctly quite low in the structure).I will show that
the proposals developed in Koopman 1994for the way in which lexical propertiesare
satisfied yield a direct and simple explanationfor the paradigmsunder discussion and
solve certainlong-standingproblemsin Dutch syntax. Insofaras these proposalsuniquely
rely on the mechanismof head movement and are intendedas a general theory for the
way in which lexical propertiesneed to be satisfied, the analysis developed here yields
strongsupportfor my 1994proposals, which can be seen as a particularimplementation
of Chomsky's (1993)checking domain.
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